Indicators of trends in environmental conditions have been touted as ways to inform the public and provide a "report card" on environmental agency performance, but no quantitative analysis of such claims has been done. A small study of New Jersey residents' reactions to indicators as presented by the state environmental agency found that these indicators were deemed understandable, credible, and useful. However, actual comprehension was not related to perceived understanding, and many in this well-educated sample exhibited the ecological fallacy of inferring local environmental conditions or priority-setting uses that these indicators could not possibly provide. Prior beliefs about statewide trends in environmental quality, accuracy in extracting information from the indicator presentations, and demographic variables had varying but significant effects on reactions to and interpretations of the indicators. These findings have implications for preparation and evaluation of institutional communications about science in general.
Background Indicators and Public Response
Indicators quantify the status and trends of a valued condition. For example, if an informed citizenry is valued, one indicator of that condition might be the trend in four-year high school graduation rates of ninth graders. Economic vitality might be measured by poverty, unemployment, or labor productivity trends. In the environmental field, indicators of clean air might include actual concentrations of ozone, the number of days per year in which the ozone standard is violated, or total fines for air pollution violations.
The development of environmental indicators has been dominated by scientific criteria, such as data quality and replicability. However, nearly every government or civic group report on environmental indicators has said that informing the public is an important goal:
• "Presently, the public finds out about environmental issues through a variety of sources that present the information very subjectively. . . . This is no longer acceptable and by adopting environmental indicator programs we can do better" (Kucharski 1994, 8) .
• "We need to be able to explain the basis, purpose and progress of our programs in more tangible, readily understandable terms to maintain public understanding and support" (Metzenbaum 1994, 12) .
• "Citizens want to know the status of environmental quality and it is important to sustain the support of the American public for environmental programs. It is essential that we enhance our ability to communicate with them about real progress in cleaning and protecting our air, land, and water" (Looby 1994, 13 ).
• Environmental performance measures will lead to "enhancement of public accountability" (McGeorge 1997).
• "Performance measurement is not really about measurement. It is, rather, about communication. . . . Performance-based measurement can help everyone in the process think more strategically . . . most important, it can help citizens understand better what value they receive for the taxes they pay" (Kettl 2001, 8) .
Many "commonly accepted" technical criteria for indicators also could affect communication, such as "relevant to the needs of potential users," "attractive to the media," and "unambiguous" (Maclaren 1996, 196) . One discussion has even focused directly on communication criteria, such as truthfulness, informativeness, relevance, and clarity (Gray and Wiedemann 1999) . However, there has been almost no assessment of the value of indicators for public use, on these or other grounds. The exceptions-public meetings whose attendees comment aloud on proposed indicators-hardly constitute systematic evaluation. (One study did use more systematic qualitative methods to obtain public input, but it concerned development of "common-language indicators"-descriptions of multidimensional measures that represented valued aspects of ecosystems-rather than evaluation of the indicators themselves; Schiller et al. 2001 .) Yet without evaluation, the ability of indicators to achieve avowed aims is impossible to determine. There have been frequent calls for the evaluation of environmental messages, preferably before wide dissemination to intended audiences (e.g., Hance, Chess, and Sandman 1988; Morgan and Lave 1990; National Research Council 1989) . Even experienced communicators can fail to anticipate how audiences will react to specific messages (Morgan et al. 2002) . Yet despite such evidence, government agencies release scientific information for the "general public" or other audiences without prior evaluation. While government cannot test every message, a case can be made for evaluating information materials to be widely publicized, particularly innovative ones whose impact is likely to be even less predictable. The evaluation (whether by academics or by government staff members) of actual institutional communications is far too rare and needs to be encouraged. This study was initiated to evaluate one agency's efforts to communicate environmental trends and is published here for three purposes: to promote evaluations of actual science communications, share results of a study of public reaction to environmental trend indicators, and test hypotheses about the reasons for those reactions. As such, it is a useful complement to the normative approach to developing science communication methods.
Prior Study
The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) is one of many international, national, state, and local agencies to use environmental indicators. NJDEP has included graphic and textual presentations of environmental indicator data in budget requests to the state legislature and public reports (e.g., New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 1998 Protection , 2000 and on its Web site (http://www.state.nj.us/dep/citizen_mynj.html). As part of this initiative, the agency funded qualitative research on reactions to indicators of statewide environmental conditions among legislative staff members, journalists, environmental activists, and citizens in New Jersey (Chess, Johnson, and Gibson 2005) , as well as the quantitative study reported on here. Reporters and activists, who often interpret government information for the public, and legislative staff members, who perform the same function for legislators who decide policy and agency budgets, distrusted agency intentions much more than did citizens. These intermediaries also stressed making indicator presentations simpler and more relevant to citizen concerns while expanding the information the indicators conveyed, and citizen interviews hinted that indicator interpretation problems deserved further study.
The value of the indicator and the usefulness of the specific graphics or text used to present indicator data can be confused by both audiences and developers of indicators, unless they compare more than one presentation for the same indicator. Such comparisons were used in earlier qualitative research (Chess, Johnson, and Gibson 2005) , but here, references to public reactions to "indicators" should be taken as reactions to "these particular representations of the indicator data."
Theoretical Expectations
While this study began as an evaluation of agency-produced indicators, the testing of hypotheses about audience response to scientific information in general also seemed warranted.
Trust has been an increasingly important factor in both the communications (e.g., Meyer 1988; Self 1996; West 1994) and risk communication literatures (e.g., Frewer et al. 1996; Jungermann, Pfister, and Fischer 1996; Peters, Covello, and McCallum 1997) . Our interest here is in the relationship between prior beliefs about environmental trends and the credibility of the indicator information.
68 Science Communication Weinstein (1986) found that New Jersey citizens tended to be skeptical about government assessments of a possible local health hazard, but much more so if the agency rated it as "no threat" than as a "threat." Weinstein inferred that people assume that government chronically underestimates the seriousness of environmental problems. Some research in trust of risk managers implies that this putative assumption might reflect the greater diagnosticity of negative information. For example, it has been argued that positive events provide fuzzier evidence of trustworthiness ("How many positive events are represented by the safe operation of a nuclear power plant for one day?") than negative events, such as a particular accident or lie (Slovic 1993) . The psychology literature provides substantial support for such a "negativity bias" (Baumeister et al. 2001; Rozin and Rozman 2001) . However, other research has suggested that a "confirmatory bias" (Hovland, Janis, and Kelley 1953; Lord, Ross, and Lepper 1979) in favor of information supporting one's prior beliefs might be a better explanation. Prior positive or negative beliefs about hazards or their managers indeed affect trust, though moderated by the strength of prior attitudes, hazard risk potential (e.g., nuclear power versus pharmaceuticals), and whether cues are events or policies (Cvetkovich et al. 2002; Poortinga and Pidgeon 2004; White and Eiser 2005) . This hypothesis also is consistent with the anchoring-andadjustment heuristic (Epley and Gilovich 2004; Tversky and Kahneman 1974) : people anchor on an easily accessible (e.g., because it is memorable) value for an uncertain quantity and then adjust from that as needed to estimate the true value. It is presumed that people tend to make insufficient adjustments, with final estimates too close to the initial (anchor) number. Given these findings, we developed the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: People who believe that environmental trends in New Jersey are worsening will find government indicators of state trends less credible overall.
Hypothesis 2: People who believe that environmental trends in New Jersey are worsening will find government indicators of improving state trends less credible than government indicators of worsening state trends.
As to how ambiguous indicators might be rated for credibility, we speculated that this would be driven by prior attitudes, which we expected would affect interpretations of the trend shown in the ambiguous indicator data (consistent with the literature on trust; e.g., Cvetkovich et al. 2002) : Experts and other elites often stress the importance of public understanding of science, assuming that people who know the facts will agree with elite interpretations of them. In the environmental field, for example, it is often assumed that informed citizens will agree that most such risks are low. However, well-informed citizens may nonetheless disagree with experts' interpretation of risk (Johnson 1993) . The comprehension and agreement measures included here (Weinstein and Sandman 1993 ) allow a test of that for environmental indicators. People who have paid close enough attention 2 to the indicator presentations to accurately answer questions on the topic and agree with the agency's interpretations may understand the indicators and even believe the information. However, they may not differ from others in whether they see trends as unequivocally improving or worsening, or the seriousness of environmental problems as universally low or high, because the presentations themselves show diverse patterns. Hence, we developed the following hypotheses: An extensive literature documents women's tendency to rate risks higher than men (see review in Davidson and Freudenburg 1996) . Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz (1994) suggested that people who felt vulnerable and without control over their risks, or received little benefit from risky activities, were more likely to rate hazards as risky. This, they felt, could explain gender and ethnic differences in risk ratings, in which white men (particularly well off, educated, and politically conservative) rate risks from various hazards as lower than do others. This suggests that gender, ethnicity, education, income, and possibly speaking English as a second language would affect views of indicator trends and seriousness of these environmental problems:
Hypothesis 6: Lower socioeconomic status will predict more skepticism about indicator information, belief that environmental trends are worsening rather than improving, and rating of these environmental problems as serious. Weinstein (1986) found that people made a distinction between state and local conditions: their experience made them rate local environmental quality as very good, while (he speculated) daily media coverage of miscellaneous local problems led people to conclude that statewide environmental quality was poor. But the earlier qualitative study (Chess, Johnson, and Gibson 2005) 70 Science Communication found that citizens might extrapolate from the agency's statewide indicators to more local conditions (e.g., where they live, work, or play), which might not be appropriate. For example, the fact beaches have been closed in certain areas because of bacterial contamination does not say anything about conditions at other beaches in the state. Even conditions, such as air pollution, more plausibly seen as covering a broad area, do not necessarily occur for the entire state or for the same pollutant, and the indicator in any event presents year-old data at best, which may not be predictive of the future. If there is a tendency to extrapolate inappropriately across geographical scales, this is an example of the ecological fallacy, in which one makes a causal inference about an individual phenomenon or process on the basis of observations on groups or larger patterns. The same problem arises in reverse when people infer that a single indicator shows whether the problem it describes is better or worse than some other issue; without comparisons across indicators (including the use of common metrics), this priority-setting inference is also invalid. Similar ecological fallacies arise more broadly in risk analysis and science communication, as when people, including professionals, improperly extrapolate population risks to individuals, or from an entire category of activity to the specific activities of a subpopulation. An example is debate over the relative transportation accident risks of automobiles and airplanes and their implications for societal and individual decisionmakers (e.g., Barnett 1991; Evans, Frick, and Schwing 1990, 1991; Sivak, Weintraub, and Flannagan 1991) . We formulated the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 7: The ecological fallacy in extrapolating from state-level indicator data to local conditions will be common, particularly among those of lesser education or lower comprehension of the indicator presentations.
To summarize, our theoretical goal here is to explain credibility and interpretation of indicators of trends in environmental quality (including a possible ecological fallacy in geographical interpretation) by (a) prior beliefs on general state trends in environmental quality specific indicators, (b) understanding of indicator information, and (c) socioeconomic status.
Method Indicators
Four versions of the instrument each showed two indicators: (a) recycling and solid waste per capita, (b) high-risk pesticides and eagle nests, (c) beach closings and shellfish harvest, and (d) drinking water and air pollution. Six indicator presentations came from the NJDEP's Web site, cited earlier, slightly modified to remove some ambiguities and ensure that each graphic and its text fit on one page. Two others (high-risk pesticides and air pollution) were draft indicator presentations on which their programs sought feedback. These eight measures covered a range of NJDEP programs and trends (see 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Weinstein and Sandman (1993) suggested several criteria for evaluating risk communications; our study focuses on three most relevant to environmental indicators. Audience evaluation criteria are probably most familiar to academics and officials alike. They include such measures as whether the audience finds the information believable, useful, and understandable, as well as whether its members want such information on a continuing basis. This feedback is relatively easy to obtain but taps only reactions of which audience members are conscious and willing and able to share with the evaluator. For example, audience reports that the indicators are understandable may be sincere but wrong if they cannot reliably take information included in the graphic or text of the indicator and report it back to researchers through answers to "factual" questions. Thus, two other of Weinstein and Sandman's criteria concern the comprehension of intended messages (understanding of facts) and agreement with claims (e.g., about what the facts mean).
Instrument
The instrument began with a question on overall progress on environmental quality in New Jersey. Information-seeking items followed, not discussed here (see note 2). Two indicators were presented, each followed by questions on audience evaluations (e.g., understandability, credibility, and salience), comprehension, and agreement. Two items-whether "this information indicates New Jersey has a serious _____ problem" and "Based on this information, how would you rate overall progress on _____ in New Jersey?"-gauged interpretation of the indicator data themselves. Unlike for comprehension and agreement, there is no standard of comparison for these items; asking similar questions of NJDEP staff members, for example, might elicit different but not necessarily more valid views. Given claims that indicators can be a "report card" of institutional performance, a question was asked on how much influence NJDEP had "over whether the situation with _____ improves or not." Information-processing questions followed, not discussed here (see note 2). People were then asked about the utility of indicators for showing trends, local conditions, and environmental priorities and about prior exposure to NJDEP's state-of-the-environment report or indicators. Demographic questions completed the instrument.
Data Collection
In On the basis of a suspicion that the problem might be the labor of evaluating two full pages of challenging indicator graphics and text, 3 the third mailing included only a shorter version 1 (only the recycling indicator; several questions were removed) sent only to nonrespondents in that subsample. The response rate was 8 percent (12 of 157), for a total response rate to the recycling indicator of 27 percent (51 of 189). Overall, the response rate was only 19 percent (147 of 770).
Respondents were 64 percent male, with a mean (and median) age of 55 years (SD = 16 years, range = 17 to 90 years); 34 percent were aged 65 years or older. Most were white (94 percent); 92 percent spoke only English at home. Some 21 percent had high school diplomas or less, 15 percent some college, 38 percent college degrees, and 25 percent graduate degrees. Household incomes were less than $50,000 for 26 percent, $50,000 to $74,999 for 26 percent, $75,000 to $99,999 for 15 percent, $100,000 to $149,999 for 19 percent, and $150,000 or more for 12 percent.
By comparison, the U.S. census for 2000 found that men constituted 48 percent of the New Jersey population over 18 years old; 18 percent of those at least 18 were 65 or older. English only was spoken at home by 75 percent. Some 73 percent of the population was white; 19 percent of those over 24 years old had college degrees, and 11 percent had graduate degrees. Some 45 percent of New Jersey households earned less than $50,000 annually. Thus, respondents' demographics were not representative of the overall state population; the survey results overrepresented people of high socioeconomic status.
However, we believe this is still a useful opportunity sample for providing experimental data, given inattention to public views of environmental indicators and our greater interest in analyzing variation in response than in its absolute level. Only 4 percent had seen the New Jersey's Environment 2000 report or visited NJDEP's Web site on environmental quality in New Jersey, so their reactions were unaffected by prior exposure to environmental indicators. The "Discussion" section probes the limitations of the respondent group in more detail.
Results

Descriptive Results
The first question in the instrument aimed to tap prior belief about environmental progress in the state. About half (53 percent) rated overall environmental quality in New Jersey as getting much or slightly better, 28 percent 76 Science Communication as unchanged or with no visible trend (e.g., "some things are getting better, some worse"), and 14 percent as getting slightly or much worse. Table 1 shows results for each of the eight indicators. 4 Overall, majorities felt the indicators were easy to understand, believable, and should be publicly available. More than half saw a serious risk reflected in nearly all indicators, except for two that showed unambiguous improvement (shellfish and eagles) and one for which the trend was ambiguous but with high compliance (drinking water). A majority interpreted most indicators as showing an improving trend. The only exceptions to this optimism were responses to two indicators that clearly showed a worsening trend (solid waste per capita and recycling). Only a fifth saw ambiguity in indicators for which trends were ambiguous (drinking water, pesticides, beach closings, and air quality). Thus, even in the face of ambiguous data, most respondents saw environmental progress. Note: "Recycling" results combine all responses (n = 51); there were no significant differences between the full and short versions of the survey. n = 39 for solid waste, n = 36 for pesticides and eagles, n = 25 for beach and shellfish, and n = 35 for drinking water and air quality. NJDEP = New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. a. Combines "much" and "slightly" categories.
A majority thought that all conditions were affected by NJDEP to some extent. Particularly striking were responses for recycling and solid waste, which seem to entail much more responsibility by individuals than government; the latter is even labeled "solid waste per capita [italics added]." The proportion assigning "a lot" of responsibility to NJDEP for solid waste trends was lower than for other topics, yet combined with attributions of "some" responsibility meant that solid waste exceeded high-risk pesticides and beach closings in the responsibility expected of the state agency. The attribution of responsibility for recycling trends to NJDEP was greater than for any other indicator. These puzzling attributions merit further research on respondents' reasoning, given arguments in favor of indicators as an institutional report card.
Principal-components analysis, available from the first author, indicated that reactions to the two indicators in each version of the instrument tended to load highly on the same factor. As a result, additive scales consisting of two items each (i.e., for each of the two indicators) were created for believability ("This information is believable"; α = 0.68), progress ("Based on this information, how would you rate overall progress on _____ in New Jersey?"; α = 0.59), and NJDEP influence (the agency "has _____ influence over whether the situation . . . improves or not"; α = 0.79).
The survey instrument also sought reaction to the "overall" (i.e., two indicators) information to which most respondents were exposed. A majority (91 percent) agreed that "it is important for the NJ Dept. of Environmental Protection to gather this kind of environmental information." Some 86 percent said the information was useful to show "change in environmental quality." Each indicator was followed by two knowledge questions (Table 2) . In most cases, the first question per indicator was "false" and answerable from the graphic, while the second was "true" and answerable only from the text portion of the indicator presentation. Clearly, most people faced with a given question got it right, from a low of 51 percent for the air quality trend question (question 15) to a high of 92 percent for the shellfish trend (question 11).
Theoretical Analyses
Hypotheses 1 and 2 concerned how prior beliefs about environmental trends in the state might affect the perceived credibility of the indicator information. Over all responses (excluding those who reported seeing no trend because "some things are getting better, some worse"), the worse people saw state trends the less credibility they granted to the indicator information (r = -.21, p < .05, n = 98). This is consistent with hypothesis 1, that Note: Correct answers are in parentheses. n = 51 for recycling, n = 39 for solid waste, n = 36 for pesticides and eagles, n = 25 for beach and shellfish, and n = 35 for drinking water and air quality. a. Combines "strongly" and other disagree/agree responses. beliefs in negative conditions would prompt skepticism about any government information.
Hypothesis 2, however, suggested that skepticism would be less if the trend data reported by an indicator were consistent with one's prior belief about trends in New Jersey's environmental quality overall. Data for each indicator were examined separately; most relations were not significant, to be expected given the small samples involved. Recycling and solid waste indicators both had worsening trends in our view. Reaction to the recycling indicator was very slightly consistent with the hypothesis (r = .04)-those who believed in worsening trends generally found this indicator of a worsening trend more believable-but not for solid waste, which reflected the general finding that skepticism about the indicator was correlated with a prior negative attitude (r = -.27, both ns, n = 32). Eagle populations and shellfish were examples of what we believed were improving trends. The eagle indicator evoked a reaction inconsistent with hypothesis 2 (r = .06, ns, n = 26), but reaction to the shellfish indicator presentation was strongly consistent with it (r = -.42, p < .10, n = 18), in that belief in worsening trends overall predicted lower credibility for this positive-trend indicator.
We had not expected specific patterns on credibility for ambiguous indicator presentations, although speculating that those who saw worsening or improving trends generally both might grant such indicators credibility. Among indicators with slightly ambiguous trends, the group who saw an improving trend statewide was much more likely to find believable the drinking water standards indicator (r = -.61, p < .01, n = 24), which exhibited high absolute performance even if the trend was ambiguous. The relation was much weaker but in the same direction for the "slightly ambiguous" pesticides indicator (r = -.16, ns, n = 26). For the indicators we judged highly ambiguous, the beach closings indicator also evoked more credibility among those who saw statewide trends in environmental quality to be positive (r = -.43, p < .10, n = 18). However, people who believed in worsening trends generally found the air pollution indicator to be more credible than those who thought things were improving (r = .22, ns, n = 24).
Hypothesis 3 was that people would interpret ambiguous indicators according to their prior beliefs about trends in environmental quality. The results showed that to be true, with positive correlations for every indicator, unrelated to our judgments of an indicator's degree of ambiguity. The highly ambiguous air pollution indicator was rated as showing a worsening trend by those who thought New Jersey's environmental quality was declining, while those with positive beliefs interpreted it as showing improvement (r = .65, p = .001, n = 23). Weaker relations held for the slightly ambiguous drinking water (r = .59, p = .002, n = 24), slightly ambiguous pesticides (r = .34, p < .11, n = 23), and highly ambiguous beach closings (r = .24, ns, n = 15) indicators.
The reactions reported above are a straightforward and positive audience evaluation and tend to suggest comprehension and agreement as well. However, these initial results present an overly optimistic picture on the latter two dimensions. While most people correctly answered each knowledge question (Table 2) , the correlation of -.24 (p < .001) of the number of correct answers and rating indicators as "difficult to understand" suggests that self-reported understanding is a poor measure of comprehension. This finding is consistent with hypothesis 4. However, hypothesis 4 was refuted on credibility: there was little correlation between correct answers and finding indicators believable (r = .05, ns, n = 130). In other words, credibility was related to comprehension but not to agreement, consistent with communication and trust theories.
Additional analyses for hypotheses 1 to 4, as well as for hypotheses 5 to 7, entailed multiple regression analyses with three types of independent variables: (a) judgments of the statewide environmental trend, 5 (b) the number of correct answers to knowledge questions, and (c) demographic items (Table 3) . Overall, the modest explanatory power of these predictors is relatively strong considering the small samples involved, and the absence of such variables as direct trust in the agency (vs. the credibility of the indicators), often found to predict risk communication reactions (e.g., Poortinga and Pidgeon 2003, 2005; Slovic 1993; Trumbo and McComas 2003) .
Controlling for other variables, our main explanatory factors operated as expected. People who believed in a worsening state environment found the indicators collectively to be less credible (hypothesis 1) and tended to interpret the indicators collectively as showing negative trends (hypotheses 2 and 3). This belief was a significant predictor of judgments that the indicator showed a serious problem for that topic, also consistent with hypothesis 3.
Hypotheses 4 and 5 concerned the role of correct answers to the comprehension and agreement questions in Table 2 . As hypothesis 4 proposed, people with more correct answers were more likely to find indicators believable and less likely to say that indicator presentations were difficult to understand. Hypothesis 5 had suggested no relation between accuracy and views on indicator trends or topic seriousness, because the study overall (and each subinstrument, except for version 1 with two worsening trend indicators) mixed indicators with different trends. People paying different attention to the indicator presentations (as reflected in accuracy) might reasonably reach similar conclusions about trends and seriousness of these sets of indicators. While Table 3 indicates that accurate people were more likely to infer worsening trends and serious problems, in neither case was the relationship statistically significant. Given the small sample and mixed data on whether systematic processors of information are more likely to see risks as high (Johnson 2005; Trumbo 1999 Trumbo , 2002 Trumbo and McComas 2003) , it would be prudent to conclude that hypothesis 5 was neither supported nor refuted. Table 3 shows that socioeconomic status had largely expected impacts (hypothesis 6). Women found the indicators less believable, while the highly educated and whites reported more belief. Women, the less educated, and older people were more likely to infer that the indicator showed a serious problem. However, contradicting hypothesis 6, there were no significant relations between sociodemographic variables and belief that indicators showed a worsening trend. Older people were more likely in general to find the indicators hard to understand.
Hypothesis 7 concerned a possible ecological fallacy in indicator interpretation, in which people would extrapolate inappropriately from statewide indicators to local conditions. The indicators reflect aggregate data for the entire state, with the exception of that on beach closings, which distinguished ocean from bayside beaches (i.e., on the nonocean side of barrier islands on the state's eastern shore). Recycling rates, pesticide uses, and compliance with drinking water standards vary from place to place, without the indicator itself suggesting which localities have better or worse conditions. People could only infer that rates of pesticide use might be higher in agricultural areas and the that high rate of compliance might give them a good shot at drinking standard-compliant water. Air quality data would have the highest chance of applying statewide, because large airsheds are involved, but the ozone action days plotted by the indicator are not necessarily relevant statewide on a given day. In short, there seemed a good potential for ecologically fallacious interpretations. The indicators also did not contrast one environmental condition with another (which would be difficult given their lack of common metrics).
However, when asked what utility the information might have, more than 51 percent agreed that it showed "what environmental conditions are like where I live" (41 percent disagreed) and 55 percent "what environmental issues are most important for government to address" (35 percent disagreed). When asked whether the indicator showed that "certain areas of the state" suffer more of the indicator-represented problems than other areas, overall, an average of 41percent agreed that it did. The two extreme responses were that the indicator presentation showed "whether it is safe to swim in certain areas of the state" (60 percent agreed) for the beach closings indicator and "whether certain areas of the state generate less waste than others" (21 percent) for the solid waste indicator. These responses on conditions, issues, and geographic differences produced a reliable interpretation problems scale ( α = 0.76), in which higher values indicate an incorrect belief that these indicators of statewide conditions for individual environmental topics report local conditions or signal relative risks of two or more environmental problems. As Table 3 shows, older people were more likely, and accurate answerers of the factual questions less likely, to have such interpretation problems. Thus, hypothesis 7, on the existence of this ecological fallacy, was not rejected. Hypothesis 7 also was not rejected with regard to comprehension of the indicators but was rejected with regard to the role of education (a slight, nonsignificant increase in interpretation problems for those with higher levels of education was unexpected).
Discussion
This research indicates both strengths and limitations of using environmental indicators. Whether policy makers want indicators to show government's effectiveness (i.e., as an agency's "report card"), prompt reasoned discussion of priorities, or "simply" be informative to public audiences, they will have to surmount some communication challenges.
The positive reactions to the environmental indicator information parallel results in nonindicator studies (e.g., on drinking water quality reports [Johnson 2000 [Johnson , 2001 or chemical factory accidents [Johnson and Chess 2003 ]): people express strong interest in information on environmental issues. A general positive halo effect from receiving this information (or even being asked what information they would like to have) may account for people's tendency in these various studies to also rate the information as useful, needed, and understandable. However, while most did get knowledge questions correct in this study, there was only a weak relationship between actual and perceived understanding of the material, and there were erroneous geographical and priority-setting inferences drawn from the indicators by many people.
Limitations of the Study
Most prominent among this study's limitations are the poor response rate and the overrepresentation of high-socioeconomic-status respondents. These limits have two implications.
6 First, one should not generalize from these findings to the entire population of New Jersey, much less to other places. For example, given its high level of education, this sample's responses might not fully reveal the difficulty of interpreting environmental indicators, even though education did not have a significant effect on either reported difficulty in understanding indicators or the presence of the ecological fallacy. These results might be better estimates of audience evaluation of indicators, in credibility for example, but again, we should be cautious about presuming that there are no demographic differences in such reactions. As for our theoretical analyses, the small set of respondents limits our ability to identify small to medium effect sizes and thus to generalize unduly from this topic to other science communication topics.
Second, this skewed response might indicate some barriers to the communication of environmental indicators. For example, perhaps such general information about environmental quality arouses no interest in most people, or at least insufficient interest to read detailed indicator information and answer a survey during the summer. Highly educated people might have been more frequent respondents because they are more motivated, and have more cognitive tools, to process indicator information (e.g., Grabe et al. 2000) , potentially skewing the distribution of practical benefits from indicator communication discussed in the "Background" section. The norm of equal access to information in a democracy would suggest a need to clarify class differences in indicator interest and accessibility. At the risk of promoting an "information paternalism," this norm also would support testing of ways to reduce any gaps that might be found, including the redesign of indicator presentation and perhaps indicator selection.
Reviewers raised questions about some of the measures used. For example, perhaps people interpreted "where I live" to mean the entire state, rather than their own localities, and thus did not exhibit an ecological fallacy. Certainly, we did not define this phrase explicitly, but this hypothesis does not explain why 41 percent disagreed that the indicator showed conditions "where I live": did they all believe that indicators clearly labeled as applying to New Jersey did not? Furthermore, this criticism does not apply to other geographical measures, which referred explicitly to "certain areas of the state," nor does it apply to the priority-setting question. However, a more diverse and explicit set of measures (e.g., "this tells me about conditions in the town where I live") in future research would allow more precise characterization of the nature and degree of any ecological fallacy in interpreting indicators.
Another reviewer concern was the degree to which, and how, people were processing the indicator materials. We used accuracy on knowledge questions, whose answers could be extracted from the indicator presentations, as our measure of information processing. But this is only one measure, and it cannot control for the possibility that some people reread the indicator materials specifically to answer such questions. We did not ask whether they did so. As discussed in note 2, our attempt to supplement this measure with selfreports of systematic versus heuristic information processing failed. These self-reports measures, borrowed from other studies, are still in their infancy; Johnson (2005) outlined several ways to improve and supplement these measures that could be applied in future research. We did not ask how much time people spent reading indicator materials; there may be some social desirability bias to such answers. We neither asked whether they looked at the indicator graphics or text (though Table 2 suggests no differential attention; see "Descriptive Results" above) nor experimentally manipulated the presence of these elements to see how that would affect reactions.
While expanded measures or altered designs are worth considering for future research, they also have their limitations. Adding measures (whether these or the geographic ones), even if only a single indicator presentation and its associated questions appear in a given survey version, could hinder an adequate response rate. The experimental manipulation proposed by a reviewer (comparing response to text-only, graphics-only, and text-andgraphics presentations) would be valuable for understanding "how the use of visuals influences message processing." It would be less valuable for grasping how people respond to actual indicator presentations: we have yet to see one in which only graphics or text appear, and myriad design choices (including the title and label "text" that appear in any graphic) limit control of variation in treatments. An experiment also would not fully replicate one of the more realistic (if rare compared with commercial "junk" mail) reallife situations in science communication, in which a government agency thrusts unexpected and unsought information on one through the mail. Experimental development and testing of normative models of message content and format are useful, but they are not always appropriate for answering specific theoretical or practical questions.
Theoretical Implications
Given these limitations, our suggestions for theory are modest and shaped more as research questions. First, our findings on the role of prior beliefs about environmental trends on perception of environmental data as indicating compatible trends, and consequent implications for indicator credibility, confirm similar findings from diverse literatures (trust, anchoring, negativity bias, persuasion, the sociology of science). The communication literature (risk, science, or in general) exhibits its own examples (e.g., Americans' views of evolution), but attention to factors affecting audiences' recall or online creation, contextual application, and possible revision of prior beliefs is still scanty. The apparent importance of prior views relative to other factors in reactions to indicators suggests that more attention is warranted.
Second, variation in audience capacity (motivation, cognitive or affective tools) for evaluating science communications also merits more attention. Our measures of comprehension of and agreement with environmental indicators, and the information processing measures we attempted, have their limitations, as do alternatives. But emerging studies clearly show (e.g., Grabe et al. 2000 ; sources cited in note 2) how important such variation can be in understanding communication effects and their implications for a democratic and sustainable society.
Third, most communication literature has focused on how the beliefs, attitudes, and social context with which audiences approach a message affect reactions to elements agreed to be in the message. For example, the discussion about prior beliefs in environmental trends concerned how they affect people's responses to an explicit or implicit statement about a specific environmental trend. But the ecological fallacies of geographical relevance and comparative priority setting found in this study concern reading of information into the message that is not mentioned therein. We are unaware of much study, other than inferences about trust in the information source, about how such readings occur and whether they might be altered by message content or format.
Fourth, mental models of attribution of responsibility for science-related conditions need as much attention as the mental models of physical causation prominent in the risk field (Morgan et al. 2002) . Our findings that people tend to see the state environmental agency as responsible for environmental trends (good or bad), even for topics (recycling and solid waste per capita) with seemingly substantial household-level responsibility, do not probe deeply into such lay beliefs. But our findings raise questions about both cognitive styles (e.g., defensive attribution) and individual barriers to behavioral change, even acknowledging that corporate product and packaging decisions, and government regulations and services, also affect these responses.
Practical Implications
First, there is the "obvious" but often forgotten dictum that asking people if they understand information does not tell you whether they do in fact understand it. The only way to tell if comprehension has been attained is to test it directly and to be sure not to confuse "comprehension" of a fact and "agreement" with the communicator's perspective (Weinstein and Sandman 1993) . All but the air pollution and pesticides indicator presentations used here were explicitly adapted from more "expert versions" by agency staff members for lay audiences. While overall, these practitioners clearly knew what these audiences would find understandable, the wide variation in accuracy on individual questions shows that the practitioners did not entirely escape the common trap of assuming they knew.
Second, while this testing is not possible for all indicators or sciencerelated messages, communicators should pretest the ones likely to be of greatest importance given their goals and priorities. Yet this process should not exclude the goals and priorities of "audiences." Interest in the latter, particularly framed as active seeking and construction of science and technology rather than as passive receipt or rejection of experts' views, has been a theme in recent sociology of science and communication (e.g., Irwin 1995; Lee and Roth 2003; Wynne 1992) . Ideally, one would use evaluative criteria of communication sources (e.g., agency staff members), audiences (e.g., citizens), and scholars, just as Santos and Chess (2003) found such a mixed approach to evaluating citizen advisory boards as a public participation method to be a superior strategy.
Third, communicators might consider adding interpretative guidance to indicator presentations and other science-related messages. This guidance could entail warnings against particular misinterpretations (negative guidance) or explicit statements of communicator interpretations of the data (positive guidance). An example of negative guidance would be a warning that a statewide indicator should not be used to infer local conditions or relative risks across environmental issues. Its intent would be to reduce ecologically fallacious inferences; the possible downside is that it would reduce the salience of such indicators for most audiences, and indiscriminate application of the warning to all indicators might be misleading or overload readers. The geographical fallacy also could be reduced by more localized indicator information, but this tactic could overload both communicators and audiences.
The positive guidance from a "bottom line" summary of the official interpretation of the trend's direction might reduce such problems as most people in this study seeing most indicators as dealing with "serious" problems: if everything is a priority, nothing is. However, such guidance could force, or be seen as forcing, a viewpoint on audiences, as intermediaries worried in earlier research about officials putting undue "positive spin" on indicator data (Chess, Johnson, and Gibson 2005) . We interpreted these eight indicators as falling into four trend classes, but citizens in our survey saw them as mostly showing positive trends, even if they still thought the problems were serious. Thus, there are political as well as ethical issues with implicit or explicit attempts at persuading audiences of a particular interpretation (Johnson 1999; Morgan and Lave 1990) . However, ethical concerns cut both ways. Knowing what the indicator source thinks the data mean can be informative, and as noted earlier, comprehension need not imply agreement. It might be ethically dubious not to explain the experts' view and their reasoning. Explaining the agency's views (including, e.g., on government's and citizens' relative responsibilities for such trends as solid waste per capita) also does not require the fieldwork potentially entailed in determining possible audience misinterpretations.
Conclusions
This small study revealed that the communication of information on environmental status and trends through indicator presentations can be welcome to public audiences, but that even well-educated samples can have difficulty in extracting information from such indicators or avoiding reading data into them. Interpretations of the meaning of indicator trends are not driven solely by the information in the indicator presentations; people bring prior beliefs to their processing of the information. As with many other science education and communication initiatives, governments have developed indicators "for public consumption" without attention to how intended audiences might receive such information. These results demonstrate the importance of studying such reactions, so that potential opportunities and obstacles can be addressed.
Notes
1. For example, about 125 articles on risk communication (vs. risk perception) appeared in the journal Risk Analysis between its inception in March 1981 and its April 2005 issue. Of these, only 4 clearly embody experimental tests of response to actual texts of government messages. Adding observational studies of awareness and response to broadcast government messages (topically dominated early by radon in indoor air and later by fish consumption advisories) would raise the number to 16 articles, or less than 13 percent of the total.
2. Risk communication scholars have begun assessing whether people process risk information heuristically or systematically (Eagly and Chaiken 1993, 305-49) , and how that might affect responses to information (Griffin et al. 1999; Johnson 2005; Kahlor et al. 2003; Trumbo 1999 Trumbo , 2002 Trumbo and McComas 2003) . The heuristic-systematic model suggests that people who systematically consider information will develop more stable attitudes than those who examine information in a more cursory, heuristic fashion (seizing on cues to the validity of the information, such as the source's trustworthiness or expertise). Trumbo (1999 Trumbo ( , 2002 found that they see cancer cluster risks as higher than do heuristic processors, though Johnson (2005) found that both groups had a slight, nonsignificant tendency to see greater risks from industrial facilities.
We applied heuristic-systematic and information-seeking measures from Griffin et al. (1999) , but they factored into only one, rather conceptually weak, dimension each (rather than the two each expected from theoretical and other empirical research, as outlined in the research cited above). It seemed more prudent to use accuracy as a quasi-surrogate of systematic information processing than use measures whose validity in this case was unclear.
3. For example, texts ran 48 to 187 words. The Flesch Reading Ease Scale (ranging from 0 to 100, with higher scored texts being more readable) and Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Scale are limited measures of reading difficulty. These texts scored from 19.7 to 43.2 in reading ease, and all were rated at a twelfth-grade reading level.
4. No differences across indicators were significant at the Bonferroni-corrected level of p < .00183, which adjusts the significance criterion of p < .05 for the twenty-eight comparisons made (otherwise, there is at least a 76 percent chance of finding a significant result across this many contrasts).
5. This question preceded the presentation of specific indicators and thus should have tapped a prior belief about environmental progress in the state.
6. Mailing indicator surveys during a season and in a manner that would increase motivation to respond is another implication. While we used the standard Dillman method for mailed surveys, it clearly did not work for this topic during the summer.
